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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to fill the knowledge gap to examine the risks in the commercial 
Real Estate market in Chinese cities. It utilises an institutional framework to examine 
the impact of urban governance, government real estate administration, and market 
practice in general and the current status of the property investment market in 
particular, on real estate market risks. Views on risks factors are gathered through a 
semi-structured interview programme of 200 professionals and officials and six focus 
groups in four major Chinese cities, i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Chongqing. The paper investigates risks in commercial property development by first 
conceptualising a property-led urban economic development model and then looking 
at aspects in urban governance, real estate administration and market practices, which 
are related to the model and tend to strengthen its impact on generating risks. Results 
of the interview programme on investment risks are then analysed according to 
property types and cities. The paper concludes that an institutional study needs to be 
built into a conventional economic analysis model to examine risks in commercial 
property investment in China. 
 
Introduction 
 
The economic reform and opening-up programme since 1979 has brought huge 
economic success to China with an average annual growth of 9.7% since 1979 
(Exhibit 1). The Chinese economy, measured by gross domestic product (GDP), has 
become the fourth largest in terms of market exchange rate, and second largest in 
terms of purchasing power parity. The country’s economy looks likely to sustain its 
rapid expansion, with three drivers, i.e. exports (Exhibit 2), fixed-asset investment 
(Exhibit 3) and domestic consumption, remaining robust in the near future. First, 
China’s exports will continue to benefit from high levels of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in manufacturing, low wages and high productivity growth. The country, 
currently ranking third in both exports and imports in the world, poises to become the 
largest trading nation in the next decade. 
 
Second, the country’s high investment ratio, at 52% of GDP in 2006 (China National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2007), ensures rapidly improving infrastructure to sustain fast 
economic growth and rapid increase in productive capacity. In particular, rapid urban 
growth, a major cause of the high investment ratio, will carry on as migration from 
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rural areas is encouraged by the government as a way to lift the living standards of the 
country’s 730 million rural population. As a result, China’s urban population increases 
each year at about 1% of the total population, requiring massive investment in 
infrastructure, housing and commercial property. 
 
Third, domestic consumption, being promoted by the government, remains at low 
levels compared to other economies. Its growth will lead to expansion of the services 
sector, which is under-developed, compared to most developing countries (Exhibit 4). 
The growth of the services industry will create demand for offices and retail space, 
which in turn sustains investment in commercial property. 
 
Exhibit 1 
Economic growth in China, the UK and the US 
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The positive prospects of the Chinese economy and the expectation of increased 
demand in commercial property have led to a development boom of offices and shops 
and an investment boom in commercial property. Since the new century, the Chinese 
commercial real estate has attracted increasing attention and investment from 
American and European investors in the last several years. In particular, such 
attention has recently been extended from front-line Chinese cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai to second-line cities like Guangzhou and Shenzhen, and in some cases 
third-line cities like Chengdu and Chongqing. 
 
Contrary to the land and residential property sub-markets, the Chinese commercial 
property market has remained poorly studied and understood by both foreign 
investors and academics. The few attempts by academics to understand China’s office 
market include Tse et al (1999) and Newell et al (2005), which provide rudimentary 
analysis of office returns in major Chinese cities, and Cao & Edwards (2001; 2002), 
which look into the institutional aspects of office development and thus the risks of 
office investment. However, these works are far from enough to provide up-to-date 
information on the rapidly changing situation in China and a through understanding of 
the mechanisms in office planning, development, investment and occupation. 
 
Exhibit 2 
China has enjoyed a growing next export since 1993 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
$bn
Expor t I mpor t  
Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics (2006; 2007) 
 
Exhibit 3 
Contribution of fixed-asset investment to GDP in China 
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Exhibit 4 
The weight of different sectors in the GDP 
50.5
28.1
19.8
12.4 11.8
20.9
48.2
47.2
47.3 48.71
28.6 23.7 33
40.3 39.39
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1952 1978 1995 2005 2006
Agriculture Manufacturing and construction Services  
Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics (2006; 2007) 
 
This paper attempts to fill the knowledge gap to examine the risks in the commercial 
Real Estate market in Chinese cities. It utilises an institutional framework to examine 
the impact of urban governance, government real estate administration, and market 
practice in general and the current status of the property investment market in 
particular, on real estate market risks. Views on risks factors are gathered through a 
semi-structured interview programme of 200 professionals and officials and six focus 
groups in four major Chinese cities, i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Chongqing. The paper investigates risks in commercial property development by first 
conceptualising a property-led urban economic development model and then looking 
at aspects in urban governance, real estate administration and market practices, which 
are related to the model and tend to strengthen its impact on generating risks. Results 
of the interview programme on investment risks are then analysed according to 
property types and cities. The paper concludes that an institutional study needs to be 
built into a conventional economic analysis model to examine risks in commercial 
property investment in China. 
 
Institutions matter 
 
This study adopts an institutional perspective, which sees 'institutions', or institutional 
arrangements, as the informal and formal rules and their enforcement mechanisms. 
Institutional arrangements govern the choices that people make and can either support 
or impede market transactions. Market-supporting institutional arrangements help 
transmit information about market conditions, goods and participants, enforce 
property rights and contracts to determine who gets what and when, and manage 
competition in markets by regulating entry and directing incentives (North, 1990). 
They serve to reduce transaction costs for market transactions. On the contrary, 
market-weakening institutional arrangements raise transaction costs and invade 
property rights and hinder the development or even the establishment of markets. 
They are the major sources of risks to market actors, including investors. 
 
For our purpose the property market itself can be interpreted as an institution 
embodying a set of formal and informal rules and conventions, and a set of market 
actors (D’Arcy and Keogh, 1999). Through this framework this paper focuses on the 
institutional characteristics of the property market in the subject cities in China and how 
different actors operate and interrelate with each other in terms of the identified 
institutional arenas under examination. In so doing, the research follows a 
well-established qualitative approach to investigate property market processes (Healey 
and Barret, 1990; Healey et al, 1995; Guy and Henneberry, 2000; Henneberry and 
Rowley, 2002).  
 
This process determines what is traded, the way in which trade takes place and the 
roles played by different market participants. Important factors that shape market 
structure and form at any particular juncture are both past pressures for institutional 
change and the market’s adaptive capacity to accommodate those pressures. Moreover, 
the institutional structure of the property market is a device to provide certainty and 
reduce the transaction costs, broadly defined, associated with the acquisition and use 
of property. Yet it can act as a constraint on efficient economic behaviour and a source 
of uncertainty particularly when institutional arrangements and relations are affected 
by ambiguity, arbitrary decisions and lack of transparency. A recent World Bank 
Policy Research Paper for example notes: 
 
“Property rights are broadly defined as the set of laws and customs, or formal 
rules and informal rules, that determine how individuals may gain access to 
resources and the range of possible uses they may make of them. … Property 
rights determine who gets to make decisions about resource use, and define 
the incentives faced by individuals with claims against these resources. The 
structure of incentives created by a society’s property rights regime will 
determine the degree of specialization in productive activities and hence the 
overall productivity of an economy. If property rights are improperly defined 
or left ambiguous and unenforced, resources will be wasted as people try to 
capture or defend their claims to resources” (Saleh, 2004, p3).    
 
At the same time we must caution against the simple general application of general 
concepts or specific successful examples. Ultimately which policies or institutions 
will promote or hinder growth enhancing investments is highly path dependent on 
existing cultural, social, political and economic circumstances of particular societies. 
What works in one country may not necessarily work in another or may be contingent 
on other institutional and contextual factors. The relative success of the Chinese 
economy in comparison to Russia during the 1990s is a case in point despite the fact 
that Russia had instituted a legal regime based primarily on private property rights 
while China still had a legal system with many fundamentally socialist features. The 
defining issue, Saleh (2004) argues, was the relative absence of predictable judicial 
enforcement in Russia that led to greater insecurity for private investors whereas in 
China the government provided sufficient protection to encourage large investments 
by private entrepreneurs.   
 
Therefore, to provide a more holistic understanding of the institutional context, its 
interaction with property market process and property investment we would need to 
take account of the broader context and institutional influences acting on and within 
the market.  
 
Institutions in the context of China 
 
The reform and opening up programme since 1979 has been a process of institutional 
change to demolish institutions of the command economy and replace them with 
institutions that support the operation of a market economy. Unlike the ‘Shock 
Therapy’ adopted by the former Soviet Union and the East European countries, the 
Chinese approach to the transition from command to market economy has been 
gradual (Liew, 1995). The advantages of gradualism are that the institutional change 
brought forward by the transition adds to and replaces, rather than destroys, the 
existing productive capacity, and that the society is allowed learning by doing to 
facilitate the shift from soft budget constraints to the discipline of the market. The 
upshot has been a steady expansion of productive capacity, rapidly rising living 
standards, and a smooth change in the society and continuity in institutions. 
 
Gradualism is most marked in the transition of administrative allocation of real estate 
resources to market allocation and is typified by the housing reform (Lee, 2000), 
which sought to replace the welfare housing allocation system with individual 
purchase at the housing market. It took about 20 years for the reform to bear full fruits, 
with the main housing solution shifting from subsidised home purchase with partial 
ownership, public housing at market rent, subsidised home purchase at limited and 
then full ownership, to purchase at market prices. Such a gradual change allows 
learning by doing to avoid errors such as full scale subsidised home purchase with 
partial ownership in the first half of the 1980s, which was not financially feasible and 
would harm the development of the consumer market. The gradual approach allowed 
for a shift in cultural values of the Chinese public in favour of owner occupation and 
accepting their responsibility for meeting the cost of their own housing. Therefore the 
final phase of housing reforms in 1998 allowed for a smoother transition than would 
have been possible otherwise.  
 
However, the gradualist reform, which allows the co-existence of administrative and 
market allocations, gave rise to large scale corruption, appropriation of state assets 
and unfair competition in the market. For example, the land use reform to change 
administrative to market allocation of land, started from 1990 but dragged on until 
August 2004. During this long time span, numerous land plots were either 
administratively allocated or sold at large discounts to market prices, enabling buyers 
to resell at market prices and develop the sites to sell property at market prices. Such a 
situation resulted in distortion of the property market with power and connection, 
rather than expertise and hard work being determinants of success. The legacy is still 
felt everywhere in the property market and visible in the urban landscape of many 
cities. 
 
Thus, the property market is still influenced by a number of rules that have their 
origin in the command economy system. The role of government as a referee instead 
of a player is still not fully understood and observed. Laws and regulations are often 
not fully enforceable because of local government intervention and lack of other 
supporting rules. The government and the legal system are still biased towards the 
producer, a legacy in the era of shortage, leaving the consumer and the investor at a 
disadvantage.  
 
Therefore, institutional barriers are often the most limiting factor in raising 
productivity and facilitating market exchange in the Chinese property market, where 
other factors of production like land, capital and labour are plenty.  
 
To aid the analysis of institutional change, a three-level analytical tool, developed by 
Kiser and Ostrom (1982) and Ostrom (1990) is employed to assist the identification of 
the nature of and relationship among institutional arrangements (Exhibit 5). It 
stratifies rules for a particular event (in this case commercial property investment) 
into operational, collective-choice and constitutional levels. The operational level is 
the bottom level where individuals and firms make business decisions. These 
decisions result in actions in the market, i.e. development, purchase and holding of 
commercial property for investment purposes. The collective-choice level is the 
intermediate level where officials make decisions, which are rules bounding business 
decisions in a market. Officials’ decisions are enforceable against non-conforming 
individuals in the market. For instance, officials may impose a tax on the sale of 
property within a number of years to deter ‘speculation’, which is enforced in title 
registration.  
 
The constitutional level is the top level, where decisions made by senior officials and 
politicians in turn set the institutional arrangements for the collective choice level. 
These decisions form the rules that officials must obey when they formulate rules for 
the market. For example, central government officials may ban local officials from 
imposing tax on rental income. Decision-making at any level is affected by the 
existence of contextual factors that are independent of the institutional arrangements 
surrounding the particular market (Edwards & Steins, 1998). The actions of foreign 
investors to make substantial number of enquiries on commercial properties in China 
and purchase some buildings in Beijing and Shanghai are independent from and 
unanticipated by the Chinese officials and developers, which changes market 
expectations and encourages developers to take extra risks in commercial property 
development. 
 
Exhibit 5 
The three-level analytical framework and the contextual factors 
 
Contextual factors 
  
 
 
 
 
Rules  Constitutional     Collective Choice       Operational 
 
 
 
Levels of Constitutional   Collective choice Operational choice 
Analysis Choice  
(Adapted from Ostrom, 1990; Edwards and Steins, 1998) 
 
The above framework can be used to explain the making of the entrepreneurial local 
governments in China, which are keen to take risks in development. To boost 
economic growth, the central government in China, i.e. the constitutional level, 
decides that the promotion and tenure of office of local senior officials are linked to 
local economical achievements (GDP) those officials promote while in office. This 
rule has led to local senior officials, at the collective choice level, to set out ambitious 
growth plans to beat their counterparts and to provide government support in 
streamlined planning approval and subsidies to some sectors, such as manufacturing 
and construction, which could generate high GDP growth. Actors in those sectors, 
either state-owned firms or private firms, are encouraged to undertake projects that 
generate high figures of GDP and employment. 
 
Field work 
 
This research uses an extensive interview programme in four main case study cities. 
The interviews were semi-structured in nature allowing for maximum objectivity yet 
encompassing the desired flexibility for iterative development and exploring issues in 
a deeper qualitative manner during the study period. The programme was designed to 
be comprehensive in its scope covering the full range of identified key actors. It 
therefore aimed to interview an average of 50 informed respondents in each city, with 
the target for Beijing being 60 given the city is the capital and that for Chongqing 
being 40 given it has a smaller property market with a shorter history. The 
interviewees are drawn from a range of actors including high ranking public officials 
at city, provincial (as in Guangdong) and national levels (as in Beijing), professional 
organisations and research and academic institutions and the private sector (major 
international, national and local developers, investors, banks and agents).  Exhibit 6 
provides the detail of the interviewed respondents in China. 
 
Exhibit 6 
Interview programme in China 
 
Category Cities Total number 
interviewed Private  Public Legal 
Typical length 
(hours) 
Beijing  62 44 14 4 1.5 
Shanghai  53 40 10 3 1.25 
Guangzhou 50 39 9 2 1.5 
Chongqing 39 28 8 3 1.5 
Total 204 151 41 12  
 
The focus groups (Exhibit 7) were a complementary tool to the interview programme 
to discuss emerging issues in greater detail and gain additional insights in to the 
operation of the property investment market. In total we conducted 5 focus groups in 
China. The main objective of this focus group was to gain an insight in to the current 
thinking and perceptions of international actors on property investment market in 
China and its inherent risks and opportunities.   
 
Exhibit 7 
Focus Groups in China 
 
Cities Nature of participants Number of 
participants
Date of meeting Time 
(hours) 
Beijing Domestic & foreign 13 20 September 2005 2.5 
Shanghai Mainly domestic 12 13 September 2005 2.5 
Shanghai  Mainly foreign 7 26 September 2005 2 
Guangzhou Domestic & foreign 16 16 September 2005 2.5 
Chongqing Domestic 18 23 September 2005 3 
Total  73   
 
Property-led urban economic growth 
 
The Chinese economic miracle owes to and also contributes to rapid urbanisation in 
the last 20 years. From 1988 to 2006 market investment in property development 
grew at 29.2% year-on-year (Exhibit 8). 12 million sqm prime office space and 7.7 
million sqm prime retail space have been built since 1992 in Beijing, Guangzhou and 
Shanghai (CB RICHARD ELLIS, 2006). Major cities boast modern bridges, ports, 
airports, mass transit railways (MTR), ring roads and other express roads. By 2006, 
MTR lines were in operation in 10 cities and were under construction in another 20 
cities. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chongqing have a total of 10 lines in 
operation, are building over 10 lines and plan to have an additional 30 lines in total in 
the future. 
 
Exhibit 8 
Growth of investment in market-oriented property development 
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Behind this remarkable urban growth is the distinct property-led urban economic 
development model (hereafter referred to as the property-led development model) 
which partly explains the urban economic development miracle in China. Local 
governments are given the task of local economic development but not the funds. To 
compensate for this, the central government at the constitutional level gives local 
governments almost full planning power and unencumbered administrative power to 
acquire and sell state land to generate funds. Local governments, in turn, use their 
planning powers to formulate ambitious city master plans and designate growth areas, 
such as central business districts (CBD), central commercial districts, and industrial 
parks. They then use their administrative powers to sell long leaseholds on 
state-owned land, referred to as Land Use Right (LUR), and compulsorily purchase 
collectively-owned rural land to convert it into state-owned land for sale. Large 
amount of extra-budgetary funds is generated in this way for urban investment. After 
land was required to be disposed of publicly in 2002, local governments often choose 
public auctions to maximise land sale revenues. The impact of open market disposal 
of land on land sale revenues is shown in Exhibit 9. 
 
Exhibit 9 
Total sale of land by government and total revenues 
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Source: Ministry of Land and Resources, 2006 
 
Nevertheless, the property-led development model has brought substantial risks to 
commercial property investment. The model gives Chinese cities land and funds to 
implement their often unrealistically ambitious development plans. While it helps to 
prepare cities to capture opportunities presented by rapid economic growth, 
over-ambition in urban development is often translated into government sponsored 
city-wide property speculation, which imposes risks throughout the property market.  
 
The risks imposed are substantiated in a wave of nationwide project failures. Frontline 
cities are not exempt to such risks. Shanghai tried to transform itself in a short time by 
approving many dozens of major office projects from 1992 to 1995, which led to 642 
failed projects (21 Century Business Herald, 2003), many of which were offices, and 
falling office rental values in 1996 to 1999 (Exhibit 11). At present office rental value 
has recovered its 1993 position due to Shanghai’s prominence in attracting foreign 
and domestic firms to set up headquarters and regional headquarters. However, 
Beijing, having the same experience as Shanghai up to 2000, has still subdued office 
rental value (Exhibit 11) due to the city’s ambition, which leads to huge amount of 
projects given go-ahead in the same time. 
 
Exhibit 10 
CB RICHARD ELLIS Shanghai prime office rental index 
 
Source: CB RICHARD ELLIS (2007) 
 
Exhibit 11 
CB RICHARD ELLIS Beijing prime office rental and price index 
 
Source: CB RICHARD ELLIS (2007) 
 
The property-led development model imposes greater risks to second-line and third 
line cities. The mid-1990s property development boom also affected third-line cities 
like Chongqing and Chengdu, which had over 93 and 66 failed projects (Chongqing 
Business Post, 2007; Sichuan Daily, 2006), respectively. In Chongqing, 1 remaining 
failed project was yet to be sold off for re-development by early 2007. In Chengdu, 30 
of the failed projects have been completed and 29 resumed construction by the end of 
2006, leaving 7 to be disposed of in the future. 
 
For marginal cities, the property-led development model could bring devastating 
impacts. Beihai City of Guangxi Province had a population of only 200,000 in 1992 
(550,000 in 2005) but large number of development projects approved in 1992 to 
1993. Eventually 136 projects failed (Xinhua, 2007), which were all disposed of by 
2006. The city, having the best coastline for tourism and port in province, has lost the 
opportunity to become a growth pole. 
 
However, many cities have now ignored the lesson and embarked on a new round of 
city-scale property development. The most notable case is Zhengzhou, a third-line 
city and the capital city of Henan Province, China’s most populous province. The city 
is building a new Central Business District (CBD) on a huge green-field site, with 60 
office buildings (30 120-metre-high buildings in the outer ring and another 30 
80-metre-high buildings in the inner ring) and a 3.4 kilometre shopping street. In 
particular, 55 of these 60 buildings were built in the same time with 35 completed in 
2006 (Zhengzhou Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2007). It is not sure who are going 
to occupy these office buildings, with those finished experiencing difficulty of sale 
and leasing. 
 
Urban governance 
 
The absolute power of local governments leads to poor transparency in urban 
governance. In our interview programme we asked interviewees to comment on the 
following number of aspects of urban governance: long-term city development vision; 
transparency in planning; effectiveness of planning control; and public participation in 
planning. The outcome of the answers is illustrated in Exhibit 12. 
 
Exhibit 12 
Percentage of interviewees unsatisfied with the way the planning system operate 
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First, more than 25% of interviewees in each of the four cities are unsatisfied about 
the long-term city development vision set by their local governments. This is 
especially so in Beijing and Guangzhou. For example, Beijing recently re-defined its 
vision to be an administrative and business centre, designating a CBD and relocating 
its heavy industry, e.g. the giant steel company. However, some interviewees argued 
that Beijing is not suitable for a business centre. 
 
Second, a minimum of 40% (Shanghai) and a maximum of 63% (Beijing) of 
interviewees in the four cities are unsatisfied with transparency of planning. It is often 
difficult or impossible to know how the urban plan is made and changed, and why 
some similar planning applications are accepted while others rejected. As a result, 
investors are often not well-informed of the latest changes in the cities they are 
operating in. Sometimes a new announcement could change the location of an area 
with serious consequences on the value of property on the previously ‘right’ locations.  
 
Third, from 42% (Shanghai) to 79% (Chongqing) of interviewees were not satisfied 
with effectiveness in planning control. Even in Shanghai, as one interviewee revealed, 
strict obedience of the plan is an exception rather than the norm. Thus, there is high 
degree of uncertainty on neighbouring developments and competitive projects even 
though the plan is known. 
 
Fourth, 71% (Guangzhou) to 81% (Chongqing) of interviewees were not satisfied 
with public participation in planning. The result for Shanghai is also unexpected as 
the substantial difference with other cities on other aspects is not repeated in public 
participation. There are some changes toward greater public participation. However, 
as a few interviewees in Beijing and Guangzhou put it, the very limited public 
participation is not heeded in earnest by the local governments. 
 
Exhibit 13 
Percentage of interviewees who perceived the problems in the planning system as 
serious 
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One further problem is that the rights of existing owners are often not protected when 
planning conditions change, with 43% to 58% of interviewees unsatisfied with the 
compensation (Exhibition 13). In addition, planning application is expensive in 
Beijing, Guangzhou and Chongqing, with 38% (Chongqing) to 45% (Guangzhou) of 
interviewees considering the costs as very high. 
 
Real estate administration 
 
After formally creating LUR on land in 1990, the legitimacy of private property rights 
was recognised by the Constitution in 2004. On 16 March 2007, the Property Rights 
Law was approved by the National People’s Congress, ending the decade long effort 
to enact a law to protect property rights. 
 
However, from 40% (Chongqing) to 65% (Beijing) of interviewees were not satisfied 
with the legal guidance on property investment and ownership (Exhibit 14). An 
obvious problem is the delay in legislation on extension and renewal of the long 
leasehold tenure in land. Interviewees pointed out that the length of LUR on 
commercial uses (office, retail, industrial, education and culture, and mixed uses), 
which was stipulated in 1990 as from 40 to 50 years, were too short. There was a case 
that a commercial property was rejected after the buyer found out the remaining 
length of the LUR was less than 30 years. In a few years time, most of the commercial 
property (mostly in mixed uses) built on LUR sold around 1992/1993 will incur the 
same problem. Unfortunately, both the government and the industry tend to ignore the 
importance of this issue, with the recently passed Property Rights Law ignoring the 
renewal issue, not to mention the extension issue. 
 
Exhibit 14 
Percentage of interviewees unsatisfied with legal and policy guidance on 
property investment and ownership 
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Also, from 38% to 61% of interviewees were not satisfied with policy guidance in 
investment and ownership. In fact, there is no formal national policy on commercial 
property. Without a state policy, new developments allowed in great numbers are 
often at the expense of existing buildings and the owners are often unable to prevent 
the expected intense competition and over-supply. As a result, issues like using 
housing as offices and opening shops in ground floor housing are very difficult to ban. 
In Beijing, a high-tech science park, Zhongguancun, has actually been developed into 
a huge office cluster for high-tech firms and other firms. In Guangzhou, the 100,000 
sqm Teemall was the first super-mall in the country and became very successful. 
However, the owners were unable to prevent the local planning authority to approve 
the development of a 300,000 sqm Grandview Mall built 200 metres away. So far 
Teemall is able to maintain its competitive advantage because it has a direct link to 
the underground railway. However, the future is uncertain as three other projects 
offering another 100,000 sqm retail space have been completed recently in just 500 
metres away, and two new projects, offer more than 100,000 sqm space have been 
approved. 
 
Market practices 
 
Current market practices also generate risks in a number of areas. Exhibit 15 
illustrates the views of interviewees on the standard of professional services, 
indicating some problems in Beijing, Guangzhou and Chongqing. However, if the 
issues of data availability and quality are considered (Exhibit 16), the quality of 
professional services is very problematic, at least in Beijing, Guangzhou and 
Chongqing. One interviewee in Beijing found holes in data provided by the 
government and chased the issue. Yet the answer was that the data were the best the 
government could offer and that the data would be improved. As a result he had to 
conduct supplementary surveys to improve the quality of the data. 
 
Exhibit 15 
Percentage of interviewees regarding quality of professional services, valuation 
and training as seriously problematic 
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Exhibit 16 
Percentage of interviewees regarding access to, and accuracy of information, in 
the property market to be seriously problematic 
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Difficulties in contract enforcement and dispute resolution in the business community 
substantially increase the risks of market operations. Exhibit 17 shows with the 
exception of Shanghai, 23% (Guangzhou) to 37% (Chongqing) of interviewees were 
not satisfied with contract enforcement in the business communities. Furthermore, 
mechanisms to allow peaceful (arbitration) resolution of disputes are regarded as 
unsatisfactory by 29% (Guangzhou) to 39% (Beijing) interviewees. 
 
Exhibit 17 
Percentage of interviewees regarding contract enforceability and dispute 
resolution as being unsatisfactory 
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In many cases, going to court is inevitable. However, there is some degree of 
uncertainty in court, as Exhibit 18 shows. Both legal clarity and legal certainty are 
poorly regarded by interviewees in the four cities. Contract enforcement by court is 
the worst aspect in the court system, with 61% (Beijing) and 72% of interviewees 
unsatisfied about their court’s contract enforcement. 
 
Exhibit 18 
Uncertainty in court: Percentage of interviewees unsatisfied with selected legal 
indicators 
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In addition to the above practices, there are a number of issues that amplify risks from 
market operations. Over-optimism and poor risk control in the poorly experienced and 
educated property industry often result in failed projects or intensive competition due 
to over supply. Inexperienced and poorly financed developers often produce buildings 
at the wrong location with poor design, imposing negative externality to neighbours. 
One interviewee, a director of a major property consultancy, complained about the 
lack of high-specification offices in Shanghai. Another interviewee in a similar 
position in Chongqing indicated only one building could be truly regarded as a grade 
A office building. Finally, the cultivation of Guanxi (Chinese style personal 
connection and nepotism) is so important that non-local firms are often disadvantaged 
in opportunities and information, although reform on disposal of government land has 
reduced uncertainty in land acquisition. 
 
Investment risks 
 
The real estate investment market in China is still in its early stages and most real 
estate professionals are yet to develop themselves in this market. Even so, the 
interview programme still produces very interesting results. Exhibits 19 and 20 
illustrate the interviewees’ perception of office and retail investment risks. It can be 
seen that liquidity, pricing and rent void are the most risky factors in office and retail 
investment.  
 
In terms of offices, even though increasing number of domestic owner-occupiers and 
some foreign investors are making en-bloc purchase deals in Beijing and Shanghai, 
liquidity is still problematic for both developers and investors in Beijing, Guangzhou 
and Chongqing due to the poorly developed domestic financing system. In second line 
cities, liquidity is more problematic. Pricing could also be an issue as many of the 
risks detailed above, like urban governance, real estate administration and market 
practices, are not taken into account in appraisals. Rent voids often occurs as there are 
large amount of new supply coming onto the market and retention of occupiers, who 
often only sign for two years, is proved to be difficult. 
 
Exhibit 19 
Percentage of interviewees regarding the office market as high risk 
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In terms of retail property, liquidity of non-prime property is very problematic due to 
oversupply, especially in Chongqing. Prime shops also have very few transaction 
records, partly because a lack of buyers able to pay the high prices. The pricing risk is 
related to the fact that the risks imposed by urban governance, real estate 
administration and market practices, which is higher than in offices, are not priced 
into the appraisals. Rent void is a major problem for secondary shops. However, 
oversupply and intensive competition may render some former prime shops having 
extended rent voids.  
 
In terms of property types, retail property has been found to be consistently riskier 
than offices, a fact related to the higher sensitivity of retail property to location and 
competition. In terms of cities, risks in frontline cities have been found to be lower 
than those in second-line cities, which in turn are lower than in third-line cities. 
Within the frontline cities, Shanghai is found to be much less risky than Beijing in 
terms of offices and retail property. 
 
Exhibit 20 
Percentage of interviewees regarding the retail market as high risk 
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Conclusions 
 
China is on the path of rapid and sustained economic growth at least for the near 
future, which has resulted in general growth of demand for property and rental and 
capital values of property. Yet the past performance of property investments in 
different parts of the country and at different times has shown high risks to unwary 
investors. 
 
The robust economic fundamentals in China signal that risks in Chinese commercial 
real estate investment will be alleviated by the rapidly growing economy, maturing 
real estate market, and ongoing reform and government intervention to increase 
transparency and accountability of local officials. However, our study suggests that 
the positive impact on investment risks in commercial property brought forward by 
robust economic growth is largely offset by the widespread adoption of the 
property-led urban economic growth model, which exacerbates the problems in urban 
governance, real estate administration and market practices.  
 
Thus risk assessment on commercial property investment in China has to take into 
account parameters in urban governance, real estate administration and market 
practices, which are difficult to quantify. A short-cut to avoid a lengthy risk 
assessment is to invest in prime properties in the frontline cities only. Opportunities in 
second-line and third-line cities need to be assessed by a model that includes an 
institutional analysis as well as a conventional economic analysis. Future research can 
be focused on developing such a model based on the insights gained in this paper. 
 
Endnotes 
1. This paper is based on a research project funded by Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 
(RICS) and Shui On Holdings. The full report is due for publication in early 2007. 
2. China’s GDP in 2006 was USD2,681.7billion (China National Bureau Of Statistics, 2007) in 
market exchange terms, which is close to the USD2,984billion of Germany (Economist, 2007), 
currently at the third place. In purchasing power parity terms, the Chinese GDP in 2006 was 
USD9,861billion, about three quarters of that of the US’s (Economist, 2007). 
3. For example, European investors like ING and Arlington have been involved in property 
development in Beijing and Shanghai. American developers like Hines and AMB and 
investment bankers like Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch have been 
involved in both development and investment of commercial in Beijing and Shanghai. 
4. Such a classification of cities is based on their economic size, growth prospects and 
investment risks. For Beijing and Shanghai, this is not controversial. For the rest, there is no 
consensus. The classification in the paper, which differentiates front-line, second-line, 
third-line and marginal cities, is for illustrative purpose only. 
5. The Chinese equivalent for the ‘failed project’ is Lan Wei Lou, meaning the project has not 
funding to complete and no purchase interest in the market even though a large discount in 
price is always available. 
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